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From Milgram to Zimbardo: the double birth of postwar psy-
chology/psychologization 
Abstract 
 
Milgram’s series of obedience experiments and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Ex-
periment are probably the two best-known psychological studies. As such, they 
can be understood as central to the broad process of psychologization in the 
postwar era. This article will consider the extent to which this process of psy-
chologization can be understood as a simple overflow from the discipline of psy-
chology to wider society or whether, in fact, this process is actually inextricably 
connected to the science of psychology as such. In so doing, the article will argue 
that Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s studies are best usefully understood as twin ex-
periments. Milgram’s paradigm of a psychology which explicitly draws its subject 
into the frame of its own discourse can be said to be the pre-condition of Zim-
bardo’s claim that his experiment offers a window onto the crucible of human be-
haviour. This will be analysed by drawing on the Lacanian concepts of acting out 
and passage à l’acte. The question then posed is: if both Milgram and Zimbardo 
claim that their work has emancipatory dimensions – a claim maintained within 
mainstream psychology – does a close reading of the studies not then reveal that 
psychology is, rather, the royal road to occurrences such as Guantanamo and Abu 
Ghraib? The drama of a psychology which is fundamentally based on a process of 
psychologization is that it turns its subjects into homo sacer of psychological dis-
course. 
Introduction 
George Miller, the cognitive psychologist, pleaded in his presidential address to the 
American Psychological Association in 1969 to ‘give psychology away’, claiming this 
would advance ‘psychology as a means of promoting human welfare.’1 Later, Miller de-
scribed Milgram’s experiments together with Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment, 
                                                     
 
 
1 G. A. Miller, "Psychology as a means of promoting human welfare." 
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as “being ideal for public consumption of psychological research.”2 Indeed, both Mil-
gram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments are clearly meant to be disseminated to a broad 
audience, in fact, didactic and prophylactic objectives seem to permeate each entire ex-
periment from the outset. Miller’s appreciation of their importance justifies a close 
reading of the experiments to further our understanding not only of the field of social 
psychology but of psychology as a whole. Milgram and Zimbardo are indeed ideal, to 
understand the place of psychology in late-modern globalized culture. On the one hand 
these experiments are widely known which contributed towards psychology becoming 
one of today’s hegemonic discourses – or to use the words of that other APA president, 
Ronald Levant – they saw to it that psychology became a ‘household’ word.3 On the 
other hand, the two experiments are not merely examples of psychologization proc-
esses, they also permit us to gain insight into the logic of the phenomena of postwar 
psychologization. In this way they can be seen as paradigmatic experiments. Hence, the 
fact that in textbooks the two experiments are invariably mentioned in the same breath 
not only points to an underlying similarity but also, as this article aims to show, reveals 
a more intricate and truly paradigmatic relationship between them. Thus, we can argue 
that beyond the historical link, Milgram and Zimbardo constitute the two logical times 
of the paradigm of postwar psychologization: Zimbardo’s prison experiment was logi-
cally the necessary follow-up to Milgram’s experiment. But before we engage with the 
experiments, we first have to address a preliminary question which will guide us 
through the rest of this article: how can we understand processes of psychologization? 
Are they simply the overflow of psychology into society, or do they tell us something 
particular about the status of the science of psychology as such? In the following section 
a first conception of psychologization is mapped out to guide us through the Milgram 
and Zimbardo analysis. 
Psychology and Psychologization 
Let us begin by questioning the effectiveness of Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments 
in having become part of our household imagery. Richard Katzev, for example, argues 
that the increasing public awareness of Milgram’s research and experiments on obedi-
ence in no way enlightened the people. Subsequent replications of the experiment 
                                                     
 
 
2 Cited in: T. Blass, ed. Obedience to authority: Current perspectives on the Milgram paradigm (New Jersey: Mahwah, 
2000), 208. 
3 R. F. Levant, "Making psychology a household word," The Psychologist 20, no. 6 (2007). 
 found no systematic decline in obedience over time, despite the extensive coverage of 
the experiments in the media and the many public and academic discussions.4 Further-
more, for Katzev, experiments that first disclose psychological findings on, for example, 
defusion of responsibility – the theory that, when in groups, people feel less responsible for 
giving help to those in distress – demonstrate that informed subjects are not more help-
ful than uninformed subjects.5 There are, however, two problematic aspects with this 
approach which immediately brings us to the issue of psychologization. First, does it not 
leave us with a strange dualism? On the one hand, there is ‘man’ susceptible to be driven 
by emotions, authority claims and situations; in short, primitive, natural, pre-
enlightened humankind. On the other hand, ‘man’ can also hold an enlightened posi-
tion, reflecting on what science says about his Mr Hyde side – even if this reflection 
proves quite pointless. The question then is, where is the pineal gland? Or, in more con-
temporary terms, what is the interface between humankind’s informed (and impotent) 
psychological gaze and humankind’s psychological substantiality as such? The second 
problem is that Katzev apparently overlooks that there are unequivocal effects of the 
increasing public dissemination of psychological theories, namely a thorough psycholo-
gization of our life-world and society. Consider how K. J. Gergen observes how liberal 
education entails familiarity with central ideas of psychology, how higher education 
confronts vast numbers of students with course offerings in the field of psychology, how 
the mass media, speciality magazines and the soft-cover book market inform the broad 
public with psy-knowledge and, finally, how the major institutions in society (in the 
business, governmental, military and social spheres) rely more and more on psychologi-
cal knowledge and personnel.6 Psy-knowledge, thus, does have effects. Furthermore, 
according to Gergen, psychologists are mostly not aware of what he calls the enlighten-
ment effect, the fact that the dissemination of psy-knowledge modifies the patterns of 
behaviour upon which the knowledge is based.  
Bringing together the two problematic aspects of Katzev’s arguments, we can come 
to a preliminary conception of psychologization. Psychologization is the overflow of the 
knowledge of psychology into society altering the way in which ‘man’ is present with 
himself, others and the world. Psychologization is the process in which psychological 
signifiers and discursive schemes result in the typical dualism within modern human-
kind which reflects upon itself having adopted the academic, psychologizing gaze. 
                                                     
 
 
4 R. Katzev, The Enlightenment Effect, Anecdote and Evidence: Essays Linking Social Research and Personal Experience 
(Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2002). 
5 R. D. Katzev and A. K. Averill, "Knowledge of the bystander problem and its impact on subsequent helping 
behavior," The Journal of Social Psychology 123, no. 2 (1984). 
6 K. J. Gergen, "Social psychology as history," Journal of personality and social psychology 26, no. 2 (1973). 
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Let us, however, immediately push this definition to a problematic limit. For, if we 
depart from Gergen’s conception of the enlightenment effect, are we not quickly led to the 
presupposition of a mythical original moment in which scientists could approach a still 
naive and virginal social and psychological reality? This would mean that it is only at a 
given point that the naive study of reality is over. That is, it is only at the close of an age 
of innocence that scientific knowledge feeds back into society and alters its reality. Ger-
gen warns against the lure of approaching this new, enlightened reality with the same 
models and techniques we might have employed previously. However, is there not a 
danger that we could interpret this as first there was psychological ‘man’, and then came 
psychologized ‘man’? Which would mean that psychologists would have to come up with 
more sophisticated research methods to unearth ‘psychological man’ beyond all the lit-
tering debris of psychologization. But then the question becomes, what would this es-
sentialist psychology be worth if (post)modern ‘man’ is above all psychologized ‘man’ and 
not psychological ‘man’?  
The necessary step to avoid this essentialist paradox is to consider psychological 
‘man’ as the founding myth itself of psychology. The modern subject constitutes itself in 
the very split of psychologized ‘man’ looking at psychological ‘man’: the new Narcissus hav-
ing adopted the academic, psychological gaze, contemplates himself as being objectified 
and thus constructed by science. The cradle of modern subjectivity and of psychology is 
thus modernity and the advent of science. And here it is crucial to see that, historically, 
psychology came to light in a reality already objectified by the sciences. Psychology was 
an answer to the fact of humankind’s life-world becoming more and more encroached 
upon by objectifying knowledge. In other words, the objectifications of science, charting 
every aspect of man’s or woman’s body, mind and environment, engendered what we 
might understand as the problem of subjectivity. The conceptualization of man as a ma-
chine,7 for example, creates the very problem of the ghost in the machine.8 This means that 
we are not dealing with a pre-given psychological subject resisting the objectivations of 
science; rather, the subject is what remains, it is the enigmatic leftover of the process of 
objectivation.9 It is here that psychology was seen to be needed. Psychology promised to 
(re)connect humankind with the Enlightened world, to find a new place for man and 
woman in a new world. In brief, psychology itself is the very interface between ‘man’ 
and an objectified world. Here it is already clear that there can only be a close relation 
between psychology and psychologization. The overflow of psychologization is thus not 
only secondary: the modern subject as such is a psychological being, a subject of the 
                                                     
 
 
7 J. O. La Mettrie, Machine man and other writings. 
8 See also J. De Vos, "From La Mettrie’s Voluptuous Man Machine to The Perverse Core of Psychology." 
9 See also: J. De Vos, "On cerebral celebrity and reality TV. Subjectivity in times of brain-scans and 
psychotainment," Configurations (2010, in press). 
 sciences, fundamentally touched by the academic reflexive gaze. In this way the radical 
conclusion seems to be that the overflow of psychology to society and its looping effects 
are the very fundamental dynamics of psychology. This would suggest that psychologi-
zation is the very way in which the discourse of psychology constitutes itself.  
This view could shed new light on Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s seminal experiments 
and their important and paradigmatic meaning for the process of late-modern psy-
chologization. While from a naive perspective on psychologization they are inaugural 
experiments, still treading on virgin terrain, a closer analysis reveals how, in both stud-
ies, psychology itself plays the leading role, showing how psychology is always and al-
ready looped psychology. But while both experiments can be read as examples of the 
structural link between psychology and psychologization, we shall argue that Zimbardo 
is the necessary complement of the Milgram experiment. The classic reproach to Mil-
gram – that his experiment is foremost an enactment and a dramatization of the issue of 
obedience – only achieves full meaning in Zimbardo’s experiment. Zimbardo’s essential-
ist fantasy, his claim to have unravelled in his experiment the crucible of human behaviour, 
is but an, equally enacted, encounter with the reality of man, with psychological ‘man’. 
The conclusion will be that Zimbardo’s experiment was needed to bring the paradigm 
established by Milgram to closure. Milgram’s paradigm, of a psychology relying on the 
psychologization of its subject matter, needed Zimbardo’s enacted discovery of the cru-
cible of human behaviour to ground it.10 
Milgram’s Shocking Answers as an Acting Out 
In Stanley Milgram’s experiment on obedience a naive subject found himself in a room 
together with another person who was actually a confederate of Milgram’s. An experi-
menter in a grey lab coat told them that they would take part in a learning experiment 
to study the effects of punishment on learning. A rigged draw assigned the naive subject 
the role of teacher and the confederate the role of learner. The latter was strapped into 
a chair with one arm connected to the so-called shock generator. The teacher, in the 
baseline condition of the experiment, was seated in an adjacent room behind a 
switchboard. He was instructed to conduct a word-pair test via the intercom and to pun-
ish each wrong answer with an electric shock, increasing the shock by one level after 
                                                     
 
 
10 I have written extensively on the Milgram experiment elsewhere (J. De Vos, " ‘Now That You Know, How Do 
You Feel?' The Milgram Experiment and Psychologization."); the present article will therefore deal relatively 
more with Zimbardo. 
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each failure. The experimenter, in his lab coat, was seated behind the naive subject and, 
whenever the test subject protested or refused to go on, he would intervene with pre-
scripted phrases such as the experiment requires that you continue.  
In an attempt to understand the horrors of the Nazi epoch, the experiment was de-
vised to study people’s willingness to obey an authority figure who gives instructions 
which conflict with their personal conscience.11 While Gordon W. Allport called it the 
Eichman Experiment, Milgram himself indicated that Hannah Arendt’s conception of the 
banality of evil came closer to his own experimental findings.12 The first thing we need 
to look more closely at, then, is how Milgram understands or, better, stages authority. 
Yannis Stavrakakis contends that Milgram understood that it is not the substance of the 
command but the source of authority that is decisive. This source is supported by a sce-
nario, or, as Stavrakakis puts it in Lacanian terms, by a fantasy scenario. For Stavrakakis it 
is clear that the phantasmatic frame in the experiment is science itself. The command is 
taken seriously by the naive subject insofar as it comes from Scientific Research.13 It is 
already clear here that the subjects are not actually naive in the sense that they would 
be pre-Enlightenment creatures unschooled in the ways of science. They are already 
addressed as subjects familiar with and marked by science. Milgram, obtaining obedi-
ence with academic currency, however, does not think this through. He chooses science 
as a mere contingent example of authority, suggesting that he also could have used mili-
tary or religious authority.14 This choice becomes particularly problematic when he ad-
ditionally chooses psychological science (the subjects are told they are participating in a 
experiment on the psychology of learning) as the focus of the experimental set-up. In 
this way the experiment is pervaded by all kinds of unquestioned loops.  
Quite surprisingly, these short-circuits are missed in mainstream critiques and, in 
this way, the real problematic core of Milgram’s experiments remains out of sight. 
While the experiments have been criticized as a mere triumph of social engineering15 or 
as a mere dramatization of people’s capacity for violence,16 the question of what exactly 
it is that is being enacted in the experiment seems to be forgotten. Let us turn here to 
the Lacanian concept of acting out. In psychoanalysis, acting out, as distinguished from 
memory or a symptom, involves an enactment of repressed material. In psychoanalytic 
practice the occurrence of an acting out is invariably linked to what one could call a dis-
                                                     
 
 
11 S. Milgram, Obedience to authority (London: Tavistock, 1974), 114-15. 
12 Ibid., 6. 
13 Y. Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left. Psychoanalysis, theory, politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 
175. 
14 S. Milgram, Obedience to authority: 142. 
15 E.g. Edward E. Jones, cited in: I. Parker, "Obedience," Granta 71, no. 4 (2000): 112. 
16 A. Brannigan, The rise and fall of social psychology (New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2004). 
 cursive deadlock. The analysand has to take recourse to an enactment of that which, in 
his or her relationship to the psychoanalyst, cannot be said. Could this shed more light 
on the Milgram experiment? Central to the Lacanian concept of acting out is the enact-
ing of the fundamental fantasy.17 Here Stavrakakis has already pointed out that Mil-
gram’s authority is based on the fantasy scenario of science. To this, I have added that 
psychology in particular constitutes the phantasmatic frame providing the script for the 
Milgram experiment. But before we tackle the question of the why – to which discursive 
deadlock the experiment responds – let us first discern how the scenario runs and, sec-
ondly, which roles or discursive positions are played out.  
Concerning the baseline of the scenario, the key is to understand the didactic candid-
camera moment when Milgram himself enters the room to lift the veils of deception, 
disclosing the learner as a confederate. The paradox is that, while Milgram wanted to 
show that obedience to authority is situational, in the moment of revelation the core of 
the experiment is revealed to be, surprisingly, individual psychology. In the post-
experimental de-briefing the use of standard questions such as Do you feel upset?, What 
did you feel?, or Now that you know, how do you feel? shows how Milgram has ended up psy-
chologizing the issue of obedience. In this way the candid-camera moment reveals the 
gaze of the big Other of academia. The experiment is the enactment of itself and of psy-
chology, as it invites its participants to subject themselves to the discourse and signifi-
ers of the psy-sciences. This is how we can understand Milgram’s triumphant proclama-
tion that the participants on the whole viewed the experiment as an opportunity to 
learn something about themselves and the conditions of human action.18 Milgram’s ex-
periment thus shows that looping effects in psychological research are not secondary 
but primary. Or, with Milgram, psychologization is the means by which psychology as-
serts itself as a science. And it does so through dramatization or, in psychoanalytic 
terms, through an acting out. 
Let us now turn to the roles and the subject positions at play in the enactment. To 
start with, the naive test-subject is, surprisingly, put in the role of an experimental 
learning psychologist carrying out a word-pair test. While it is rather illogical to be 
asked to conduct an experiment, strangely enough not one of the participants questions 
this. Perhaps we have 100 per cent obedience here because the assignment of this role 
simply repeats general psychologization processes in which everyone is turned into a 
proto-psychologist and encouraged to adopt a scientific gaze. But, more importantly, is 
it not exactly in the role of psychologist that the subject is situated as the obedient bu-
reaucrat inflicting torture and pain?  
                                                     
 
 
17 F. Koehler, "Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan," in Reading Seminars I and II: Lacan's Return to Freud, ed. R. 
Feldstein, B. Fink, and M. Jaanus (Albany: Suny Press, 1996), 116. 
18 S. Milgram, Obedience to authority: 196. 
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Whether Alfred McCoy was right or not in claiming that the Milgram experiment was 
funded with CIA money, implying the direct connection with the CIA’s infamous mind-
control project,19 this is not so important in view of the fact that the experiment as such 
is a theatrical inauguration of psychologists assisting in torture. However, to return to 
the Milgram experiment, if it is 100 per cent obedience that we are looking for, there 
might be a much easier place to find it. Did Milgram not get his 100 per cent obedience 
from the experimenter who instructed the test-subject with his monotone prompts such 
as You have no other choice, you must go on. Milgram’s film footage shows an experimenter 
mechanically and emotionlessly repeating his scripted phrases while the obviously agi-
tated and stressed subjects express their desire to stop.20 So, while Milgram dismisses 
the Freudian explanation of aggressive and destructive tendencies,21 do these not re-
emerge unexpectedly on the side of the experimenter? One must conclude that the obe-
dient bureaucrat-torturer was already written into the experiment. As Dannie Abse sug-
gests, Milgram, looking for little Eichmans, constructed a scene with an experimenter in 
the role of Himmler.22 This leaves us with Milgram’s own role. Is he not the figure of the 
ultimate malevolent scientist collecting from his participants the surplus-value of his 
scripted experiment? His post-experimental Now that you know, how do you feel? is meant 
to harvest the psychologizing answers to make his case on obedience. Furthermore, in 
the same movement, Milgram’s subjects get de-subjectivized as they are reduced to the 
obedient objects of the power of psychological knowledge. Milgram reports proudly that 
a large number of subjects spontaneously requested to be used (sic) in further experi-
ments.23 Consumed in the candid-camera moment, the test-subjects become the mere 
objects of the psy-sciences. The introspective moment in which the experiment culmi-
nates reveals nothing but the pre-scripted analysis. Milgram’s promised emancipation 
from blind obedience is actually a mere enactment of the powerful and un-
emancipatory discourse of psychology.  
Having discerned the different roles being played in Milgram’s acting out, we can now 
address the question of why? In clinical terms there are always reasons why an acting out 
emerges instead of a memory or a symptom. It is useful to start here with Lacan’s argu-
ment that both acting out and a passage à l’acte are attempts to ward off anxiety. In con-
trast to a passage à l’acte, however, there is still a relationship at play in acting out. The 
                                                     
 
 
19 A. W. McCoy, A question of torture: CIA interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror, vol. Metropolitan 
Books (New York, 2006). 
20 S. Milgram, "Obedience," (University Park , PA: Penn State Audio Visual Services, 1965). 
21 S. Milgram, Obedience to authority: 165. 
22 Cited in: A. Brannigan, The rise and fall of social psychology. 
23 S. Milgram, "Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority," Human Relations 18, no. 1 (1965): 
58. 
 subject still calls upon the Other to respond to his or her act.24 A typical example is the 
attempted suicide which functions as a cry for help. The relational aspect is also clear in 
the fact that acting out is almost invariably preceded by a significant other having not 
heard or not answered some earlier appeal or message. If Milgram’s experiments are an 
example of acting out, then the anxiety at play can, as noted above, be linked to Arendt’s 
notion of the banality of evil. The relational deadlock – in psychoanalytical terms the 
deadlock of transference – is, then, a deadlock in understanding the Holocaust. Acade-
mia – functioning as the Big Other in modernity – has fallen short of even the begin-
nings of an understanding. Milgram’s experiment can thus be understood as the con-
struction of a scene in which the big Other of science is (re)installed as an agency which 
will deliver the proper interpretation. Milgram’s shocking answers (Zimbardo’s quip) are 
staged in order to deal with the incomprehensible horrors of the Holocaust. The ex-
periment is the mise-en-scène of ‘man’ as an easily manipulated and naive everyday sub-
ject who can be saved and redeemed by science. In Lacanian terms, this would be the 
subject as objet a: the cause and object of the desire of the Other.  
The problem with acting out, however, is that when it is not interpreted (not worked 
through, in Freudian terms) there is always the threat of its culminating in a passage à 
l’acte. Repeated suicide attempts, for example, can suddenly lose their relational dimen-
sion and shift to a real step beyond the relational scene. However, this does not neces-
sarily entail a definite exit from the scene. It can also be a momentary dissolution of the 
subject and of the social bond. In the meantime what manifest are instances of brute 
force (fights, suicide …), flights from the dimension of the Other to the dimension of the 
Real.25 This brings us to Zimbardo’s claim that the Stanford Prison experiment offers us 
a window onto the brute force of humankind. Zimbardo’s main argument is that he was 
carried away in the set-up of his own experiment but this loss of control is actually what 
discloses the ‘truth’ of human interaction. Translated in psychoanalytic terms this 
would be to say that Zimbardo was caught up in an acting out (being carried away in the 
role of his own script) which eventually tilted over into a passage à l’acte, revealing the 
Real of the human subject in an unmediated way. 
                                                     
 
 
24 J. Lacan, Le séminaire, Livre X: L'angoisse, 1962-1963 (Paris: Seuil, 2004). 
25 D. Evans, An introductory dictionary of Lacanian psychoanalysis: 137. 
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Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment: a Prison run by Psychologists 
Historically, Zimbardo’s prison experiment cannot be seen apart from Milgram’s ex-
periment on obedience.26 Zimbardo himself recognizes his indebtedness to Milgram and 
acknowledges various parallels between the Stanford Prison Experiment and Milgram’s 
research on obedience.27 Nevertheless, Zimbardo’s experiment contests Milgram’s thesis 
that authority is central in phenomena of obedience and puts forward the thesis that 
people blindly enact what is expected of them in their role as group members. In this 
section I will explore the parallels and the differences between the two pieces of re-
search and try to assess in which ways Zimbardo is departing from the Milgram para-
digm only, as we will see, to return to it in the end. My focus is thus not so much the 
historical link, but rather, the paradigmatic link, which, as I will claim, can be under-
stood as follows: Zimbardo’s experiment is the necessary logical sequel to Milgram’s 
experiment. 
To begin with, perhaps the most striking parallel between Milgram and Zimbardo is 
how the discourse of psychology – and even the signifier psychology as such – occupies a 
central, albeit unquestioned, place in both experiments. That said, considering their 
respective advertisements to recruit participants, something has clearly changed in the 
time between the two studies. While Milgram needed people “for a study of memory”, 
Zimbardo recruited explicitly for “a psychological study of prison life” (emphasis added). 
With Milgram it may have been clear to the participants that the experiment was situ-
ated within science, but it is only at a particular moment that psychology itself entered 
the scene, with the question Now that you know, how do you feel? It is only here that the 
subject is explicitly drawn into psychological discourse. As such, the Milgram experi-
ment illustrates the shift in late-modernity from the master discourse (with a master fig-
ure as the agent) to the university discourse (where knowledge itself is the agent). Mil-
gram’s psychologizing question Now that you know, how do you feel? leaves behind the 
old master, exemplified in the authoritative figure in the lab coat, and opens the way for 
the university discourse, in which the knowledge of the psy-sciences takes the prominent 
role. Milgram, in this way, does indeed conduct an experiment on obedience. He shows 
or, better, enacts how, in the psychologization processes of late modernity, humankind 
is called upon to subject itself to the psy-sciences. Zimbardo takes this logic one step fur-
                                                     
 
 
26 In his book The Lucifer Effect Zimbardo amply discusses the Milgram experiment, noting also his personal 
acquaintanceship with Stanley Milgram (P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect (New York: Random House, 2007), 518. 
27 See especially P. Zimbardo, "The Power of Norms and Groups on Individuals: Parallels Between the Stanford 
Prison Experiment and Milgram’s Obedience Research.,"  
http://www.lucifereffect.com/about_content_norms.htm. 
 ther. With Zimbardo, psychology is no longer called upon to structure the scene in a 
second moment. From the very beginning the scene is set within a psychological dis-
course: “male college students needed for psychological study of prison life.”  
So where Milgram has his psychologizing de-briefing moment, Zimbardo has his psy-
chologizing pre-briefing. The selected students were divided randomly into guards and 
prisoners, and the first group had to attend a so-called guard orientation meeting the day 
before the actual experiment. There Zimbardo addressed the guards:  
You can create in the prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some de-
gree, you can create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally controlled by 
us, by the system, you, me – and they’ll have no privacy. … We’re going to take 
away their individuality in various ways. … We have total power in the situation. 
They have none.28 
This is surely quite directive. However, Zimbardo’s co-researcher Craig Haney strongly 
downplays this, repeating several times that the guards were only told that they were 
not allowed to use physical punishment or aggression.29 Also Zimbardo invariably 
minimizes this step. In his latest book, The Lucifer Effect, he maintains that the guards’ 
orientation did not encourage them to follow a prescribed path.30 But while this passage 
is criticized by many authors,31 surprisingly none of the critics appear to see that the 
participants are effectively asked to take on the role of experimenter. Zimbardo literally 
tells the guards that it is up to them to produce the “required psychological state in the 
prisoners.”32 There is no doubt that the experiment is scripted, but we should not miss 
the fact that the script is psychological. The student-guards are asked to play the role of 
social scientists conducting an experiment. Banyard is right in stressing the awkward 
use of the pronoun we in we have total power,33 but this should not be understood as we the 
guards but, rather, as we the psychologists.34 While with Milgram we have a similar sce-
                                                     
 
 
28 P. Zimbardo, "Quiet rage: The Stanford prison study video," (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989), 
my transcription. 
29 C. Haney, C. Banks, and P. Zimbardo, "A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison.," in Readings 
about the social animal, ed. E. Aronson (San Franciso: Freeman, 1981). 
30 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: 54. 
31 E.g. P. Banyard, "Tyranny and the tyrant. Zimbardo's 'The Lucifer Effect' reviewed," The Psychologist 20, no. 8 
(2007); A. Brannigan, "Review: The Defense of Situationalism in the Age of Abu Ghraib," Theory & psychology 19, 
no. 5 (2009); S. A. Haslam and S. D. Reicher, "Questioning the banality of evil," The Psychologist 21, no. 1 (2008). 
32 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: 55, emphasis added. 
33 P. Banyard, "Tyranny and the tyrant. Zimbardo's 'The Lucifer Effect' reviewed." 
34 Furthermore, we should note that not only did the group of guards comprise volunteers, but the role of 
warden was played by an undergraduate research assistant while Zimbardo himself took the role of superin-
tendent. 
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nario of the test-subject being put in the place of the scientist, Zimbardo brings this 
scheme to a logical completion. The Milgram experiment does not really involve role 
play. The naive subject agrees to perform an assignment in which he effectively remains 
himself (in the naive sense). It is only at the end that it is disclosed that he has been 
playing a role. With Zimbardo it is all out in the open. Not only is it clear who is playing 
which part, but it is also clear to everybody that it is all a role play. The essential trick of 
role play is the staged lucidity within a redoubled role. Zimbardo’s students are not so 
much instructed to play guards. Rather, they are instructed to play psychologists pre-
tending to be guards.  
Another point of comparison between the experiments concerns the role of the vic-
tim. Zimbardo’s shift here is to introduce the role of the prisoner, where he effectively 
fleshes out the victim-role which in Milgram was still played by a confederate. But there 
is something particular to be discerned in this shift. For, do we not find here another 
instance of something that remained concealed with Milgram being laid bare with Zim-
bardo; namely the aspect of humiliation? With Milgram humiliation is implicit and only 
emerges in the de-briefing, where the test-subject is confronted with his reprehensible 
behaviour and reduced to a mere object of social psychology. In this way, the ingenious 
and powerful science of psychology manages to extract from the test-subject valuable 
knowledge concerning the true nature of humankind – which of course bears a struc-
tural resemblance to the use of torture to obtain information. In Zimbardo’s experi-
ment, however, the humiliation is made explicit and primary as it shifts to the category 
of the prisoners. This is how Haney and Zimbardo describe their induction:  
A degradation procedure was designed in part to humiliate prisoners and in part 
to be sure they weren’t bringing in any germs to contaminate our jail. The prison-
ers were deloused and decontaminated, they were made to wear baggy uniforms 
without underwear, they had to wear stocking caps to conceal their hair …35 
This de-humanization and de-subjectivation of the prisoners had started already with 
the staged arrests, as the students were unexpectedly picked up at their homes by local 
police officers while surprised and curious neighbours looked on and then, blindfolded, 
they were driven “in a state of mild shock” to the “Stanford County Jail.”36 Initially the 
                                                     
 
 
35 C. Haney, C. Banks, and P. Zimbardo, "A study of prisoners and guards in a simulated prison.." 
36 Here another difference with the Milgram experiment emerges. If Milgram’s experiment leant on the format 
of candid camera – with the experiment culminating in the moment of disclosure of the deception – the Stan-
ford Prison Experiment is much closer to the format of reality television. Consider how the surprise Sunday 
arrests were filmed (by actual network stations Zimbardo managed to involve) and how the rest of the expe-
riment was watched over by cameras, prefiguring the huit clos of shows like Big Brother (for the role of the mass 
media in relation to the processes of psychologization see J. De Vos, "On cerebral celebrity and reality TV. 
Subjectivity in times of brain-scans and psychotainment."). 
 regime is quite mild and things only start to unravel on the second day. The prisoners 
remove their stocking caps, rip off their numbers and barricade themselves inside the 
cells. Zimbardo writes that he was stunned. He had not expected a rebellion and it was 
not clear to him what they were rebelling against. But, one is tempted to see Zimbardo’s 
surprise as feigned: for were not these kinds of events what he had hoped for? More-
over, in his being stunned, Zimbardo misses how this seemingly spontaneous rebellion 
was discursively structured, as the participants shouted: 
A fucking simulation! It is a fucking simulation, it is a fucking simulated experi-
ment!37 
Given the fact that the rules forbade the prisoners to refer to their condition as an ex-
periment or a simulation, the rebellion above all seems directed against the simulation of 
the experiment itself. Whether the students really had enough of the experiment, as 
Banyard suggests,38 is perhaps not really the point. That they shouted “Fuck this ex-
periment. And fuck Dr. Zimbardo!”39 should have made Zimbardo understand that he 
was receiving his own message in an inverted form – an essential trope in communica-
tion according to Lacan.40 Zimbardo, however, remains deaf to the looping of the theo-
retical framework of social psychology which contaminates the whole experiment. He 
remains convinced that he sees the ‘real thing’ and does not appear to understand the 
dynamics of his own script. With Milgram the script entailed the juxtaposition of au-
thority and conscience, which was then transcended by the psychologizing disclosure of 
the de-briefing. Zimbardo, on the other hand, begins with the assumed power of psy-
chological discourse itself and what results from this is the creation of an opposition 
between those within this discourse and those outside it. In other words, while the 
guards’ orientation constitutes a class of those informed by psychology, in the same 
movement, it constitutes the prisoners as the humiliated and debased homo sacer of the 
psychological discourse. For Giorgio Agamben,41 a discourse of power always produces a 
class of excluded–included. Homo sacer is banned from the ruling order but nonetheless 
totally defined by it.42 
                                                     
 
 
37 P. Zimbardo, "Quiet rage: The Stanford prison study video," my transcription. 
38 P. Banyard and C. Flanagan, Ethical issues and guidelines in psychology (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
39 P. Zimbardo, "Quiet rage: The Stanford prison study video," my transcription. 
40 J. Lacan, Ecrits: A selection (London: Tavistock, 1977), 85. 
41 G. Agamben, Homo sacer. 
42 For example, Europe, as a juridical-sovereign order, produces the sans-papiers. They are not a part of the 
legal order but, nonetheless, they are defined by it. In this very way the sans-papiers function as a guarantee of 
that order. 
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This is precisely what Reicher and Haslam miss in their BBC Prison Study.43 Their 
study challenges Zimbardo’s theory that behaviour is determined by assigned roles. Rei-
cher and Haslam criticize the underlying message here that resistance is futile. Conse-
quently, the BBC Prison Study focuses on ‘the manipulations of theoretically relevant 
variables’ rather than assigned roles. Summarizing their findings, Reicher and Haslam 
state that it is powerlessness and a failure of the group that makes tyranny psychologi-
cally acceptable. That these results seem to ‘prove’ what had to be proved is not the is-
sue here. Far more important is that Reicher and Haslam psychologize the situation 
even more than Zimbardo. Every day, the participants were subjected to psychometric 
testing and ‘swabs of saliva’ were taken in order to ascertain cortisone levels. They knew 
they were being video-- and audio-recorded at all times (the experiment was broadcast 
as a reality TV show) and that two independent clinical psychologists were monitoring 
the study throughout. Is this not the paradox of psychology as the ultimate tyrannical 
Big Brother? The remark of one of Zimbardo’s participants that the Stanford Prison was 
“a prison run by psychologists,”44 gets fully realized with Reicher and Haslam. In con-
trolling every theoretically relevant variable, they assess and control even the psycho-
social determinants of the emancipatory potential. In this way, the homo sacer position 
of Zimbardo’s prisoners is effectively generalized with Reicher and Haslam. Every par-
ticipant is the excluded–included subject of the hegemonic psychological discourse and 
it is this that provides the rationale and the ultimate guarantee of the discourse. But 
staging absolute control makes Reicher’s and Haslam’s experiment rather dull since it 
cannot really provide anything like Zimbardo’s high-pitched dramatics. 
In Zimbardo’s experiment it gradually becomes clear that the psychologizing of the 
guard–prisoner opposition is the very motor of the drama. While Milgram himself did 
the psychologizing, with Zimbardo this task is assigned to his participants. This is how 
we can understand that, after crushing the initial rebellion, the guards announced that 
they were going to resort to “psychological tactics instead of physical ones.” This is, of 
course, nothing more than the signifier psychology taking yet another tour on the merry-
go-round of the experiment, preparing us for yet another turn, as the brutal guard 
nicknamed ‘John Wayne’ takes centre stage. In the next section this figure will be the 
point of departure to question whether Zimbardo’s experiment is equally, as with Mil-
gram, an acting out or, rather, a passage à l’acte. 
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 From acting out to passage à l’acte … and back again 
‘John Wayne’ exemplifies for Zimbardo “the point in time when an ordinary, normal 
person first crosses the boundary between good and evil,”45 and thus illustrates that it is 
not authority, as in Milgram’s experiment, but role assignment which explains obedi-
ence and consequent reprehensible and shocking behaviour. Many commentators focus 
on ‘John Wayne’ to launch critiques of the experiment as a pre-scripted role play. Zim-
bardo eventually concedes that acting was the first step in the student Dave Eshleman’s 
becoming ‘John Wayne’ but he argues that, by living the part for eight hours a day, Esh-
leman began ‘internalizing his character.’46 Is Zimbardo’s experiment then also to be 
understood as an acting out? If so, the questions are again: what is the baseline of the 
scenario and who plays which parts? 
Eshleman’s own explanation was that he drew his inspiration from the fraternity 
hazing he had just gone through: 
And a lot of these things I’m sure just sort of popped into our heads to see, you 
know, we were kind of testing the limits. You know they did anything we told 
them. Where’s the point where they would stop and object?47 
If we take this seriously, then this puts a big question mark over Zimbardo’s claim that 
the behaviour ‘John Wayne’ displayed can be understood as authentic and independent 
of the experiment itself, for hazing always takes place in the absence of any official 
agent of authority. Those conducting the hazing act to test the limits of the authority 
they have temporarily assumed and exercise this authority against an anonymous 
freshman.48 Slavoj Žižek points out that in hazing the mimicking of the absent authority 
clearly reveals the obscene underside, the obscene surplus already present in the regu-
lar authority.49 In order, then, to discern what kind of authority is really being mobilized 
in the Stanford Prison Experiment, Eshleman’s remarks are very helpful. In an interview 
he explains that he was acting to help Zimbardo get results. He tells us that the first 
night he was struck by the fact that everybody was treating the study like summer 
camp: 
                                                     
 
 
45 P. Zimbardo, "Who was Lucifer and how did he become the Devil,"  
http://www.lucifereffect.com/lucifer.htm. 
46 Cited in: A. Zarembo, "A Theater of Inquiry and Evil," Los Angeles Times, July 15 2004. 
47 A. Cooper, "New Photos of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Released; Bush Backs Rumsfeld," in 360 DEGREES (CNN, 2004). 
48 This is maybe why Zimbardo took the role of superintendent. In doing so, he could join the guards and 
create a band of brothers. Consequently, the real authority at stake in the experiment, Academia, is displaced. 
49 S. Žižek, "What Rumsfeld Doesn’t Know That He Knows About Abu Ghraib," In These Times, 2004, 21 June 
2004. 
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… I decided that nothing was really happening in this experiment and that in or-
der for this experiment to get any results that somebody had to start to push the 
action and I took it upon myself to do so. 50 
Strangely enough, almost the same words return with Zimbardo:  
On the first day, I said, this is not gonna work. I mean, the guards felt awkward, 
giving orders. And they’d say, okay, line up, and repeat your numbers. And the 
prisoners would [start] giggling.51 
This is not the only discursive short-circuit. Zimbardo states that he borrowed the idea 
of the guards wearing sunglasses from the movie Cool Hand Luke52 and then Eshleman 
mentions the same movie as the inspiration behind his prison guard character.53 Is this a 
case of trading places? Is ‘John Wayne’ the uncanny double of Zimbardo, revealing a 
problematic core of the psy-sciences? Eshleman, for example, argues that he was run-
ning a little experiment on his own. Concluding that the experiment was put together to 
prove a point about prisons being cruel and inhumane places, Eshleman decided ‘to help 
those results come about.’54 In this sense, the brutal ‘John Wayne’ appears as the gestalt 
of the mad scientist.55 So if the experiment reveals something about evil, as Zimbardo 
claims, is this not about evil emerging in the relation between the social and human sci-
ences and the discourses of power? Evil is, then, the inevitable dark side, the underlying 
truth of a discourse which claims to be human and to do good. In Milgram’s experiments 
this was acted out in different places. It first appears with the test-subject who, in his 
role of experimental psychologist, is lured into bureaucratically performed cruelty. It is 
then located with the experimenter who, as a mad scientist, presses the poor, naive test-
subject to continue. Finally, it is located with Milgram himself, as he enters the room to 
disclose the experimenter as the embodiment of malevolent science and to exchange 
the master discourse with the university discourse. Here Milgram proves to be the ultimate 
demiurge; having extracted the valuable knowledge from his subjects, he leaves them 
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 behind, humiliated and subjected to a pseudo-emancipatory psy-discourse. Zimbardo’s 
experiment takes up the issue where Milgram leaves off, showing what happens when 
the scenario operates entirely under the university discourse. It is in this context that we 
have to understand Zimbardo’s excuse for having inflicted real pain on his participants. 
He admits that he got carried away in his role and was beginning to think like a prison 
superintendent rather than a research psychologist.56 Is not this contention, however, 
which we can translate as a claim to having been drawn into an acting out, the ultimate 
excuse for not having to deal with his problematic role as experimental psychologist? 
Maybe we should simply hold Zimbardo responsible for being carried away as a psy-
chologist, especially where, on top of acting out, he claims to have assisted in a momen-
tary disclosure of the crucible of human behaviour – or, translated into Lacanian terms, he 
claims to have been caught in a genuine passage à l’acte. 
The mark of the passage à l’acte is that the social bond, the dimension of the big Other, 
is suspended as the subject steps outside of symbolic, mediated reality and enters the 
Real. Typical instances of passages à l’acte would be suicides, outbursts of violence and 
fugues. These instances are a testimony of a subjective deadlock which cannot be mobi-
lized via a recourse to a phantasmatic driven enactment or acting out, instead there is a 
disruptive and often violent stepping out of the scene. Could we not also add to this list, 
Zimbardo who is being drawn into a seemingly unmediated scene of brute and direct 
violence? When Zimbardo’s girlfriend visits the experimental prison a strange and deci-
sive moment takes place. Christina Maslach, who had just earned her doctorate in psy-
chology under Zimbardo, is confronted from the open door of Zimbardo’s superinten-
dent’s office with the ‘toilet run chain gang’, the line of hooded prisoners being led to 
the lavatory. Zimbardo urges her to look and relates her answer: 
‘I already saw it’. And she looked away again. 
I was shocked by her seeming indifference. 
‘What do you mean? Don’t you understand that this is a crucible of human behav-
ior, we are seeing things no one has witnessed before in such a situation.’57 
Zimbardo seems convinced he is looking at bare life itself, showing his girlfriend the 
laboratory version of the Big Bang, the genesis of vibrating and pulsating life. Is this not 
the essentialist fantasy noted earlier: the presupposition of a mythical moment wherein 
the psy-scientist is able to see things as they are? Zimbardo himself thus appears as the 
sovereign, mad scientist with Frankenstein’s life or the unmediated Real in his hands. It 
is here that we can see him as immersed in his own creation and himself drawn into a 
                                                     
 
 
56 P. Zimbardo, "Stanford Prison Experiment Slideshow: A visit,"  http://www.prisonexp.org/slide-27.htm. 
57 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: 169. 
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seemingly genuine passage à l’acte. The rest of the story seems to back up this narrative. 
Christina Maslach looks away in disgust and understands that to pull Zimbardo back to 
reality she has to introduce love into the equation by making Zimbardo choose between 
the fascinating Siren-like crucible of human behaviour and her love in the actual world. 
Maslach describes how she told Zimbardo that he had become a stranger to her, that she 
did not recognize ‘the caring and compassionate person’ she once knew: 
I’m not sure I want to, you know, have anything to do with you if this is the real 
you.58 
For Zimbardo this was a slap in the face, “the wake-up call from the nightmare that [he] 
had been living day and night for the past week,” and he decided to call the experiment 
off.59 Maslach reports that a great weight was lifted from both of them and from their 
personal relationship.60 So, the story ends and they married and lived happily ever after. 
However, if we do not accept Zimbardo’s acting out (his claim that he was carried 
away in his role as superintendent) we should be equally wary of conceding that he was 
engaged in a passage à l’acte. For on a closer look, the thesis that Zimbardo is totally im-
mersed in a passage à l’acte presents several problems. Does not, for example, the fact 
that Zimbardo asks his girlfriend to watch the prisoners being led to the toilet presup-
pose a relational dimension? A second clinical objection might be that one is rarely con-
fronted with first-person elaborations of a passage à l’acte. As a rule the subject of a pas-
sage à l’acte would be left baffled and the events would usually be related or recon-
structed by a third party. The idea that Zimbardo is engaged in a passage à l’acte thus be-
comes less and less plausible. Remember Zimbardo’s hunch at the beginning of the ex-
periment that it was ‘not gonna work’ (and Eshleman adding that somebody had to push 
the action). The experiment, which involved substantial expense, had to be saved, as did 
Zimbardo’s career. Should the subsequent escalation not then be seen as a dramatiza-
tion of “pushing the envelope,” as Eshleman called it, to reveal the true face of human-
kind in a violent Armageddon? The dramatic passage à l’acte-like denouement of closing 
down the experiment might thus, above all, have served to bring the experiment to a 
nice conclusion, complete with Zimbardo’s mea culpa.61 Instead of a step into the Real, 
this imagery brings us back to the stretched boundaries of symbolically mediated real-
ity.  
Zimbardo’s account of the crucible of human behaviour thus returns us to a Mil-
gramesque acting out. And then the question is once again, what is the fantasy scenario 
                                                     
 
 
58 Sundance Channel, "The Human Behavior Experiments." 
59 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: 170. 
60 Ibid., 171. 
61 I am indebted to Ian Parker (Manchester Metropolitan University) for these comments 
 that underlies the image of Zimbardo standing at the edge of the abyss of humanity? 
Here Zimbardo, keen as he is on romantic imagery – just think about the imagery of The 
Lucifer Effect – might have been inspired by the Faustian mad scientist and the related 
Gothic theme of unravelling the secrets of life. There is some circumstantial evidence to 
support this idea. If the study can be understood to culminate in an all’s well that ends well 
marriage, this theme is already redoubled in the experiment itself. At one point the 
guards stage a mock marriage featuring, most aptly, Frankenstein:  
‘Why don’t you play Frankenstein. 2093, you can be the bride of Frankenstein. … 
7258, you be Frankenstein. I want you to walk over here like Frankenstein, and say 
that you love 2093.’62 
‘John Wayne’ brutally shoves the prisoners together into an embrace, making them say I 
love you. Of course it can be argued that this mock marriage is a mere coincidence and 
that it would be stretching things too far to connect it to the personal story of Zim-
bardo. But is not this image of the monster created by science already lurking under the 
surface of the experiment, only to be brought to the surface by Eshleman who immedi-
ately sensed that the experiment was meant to bring out “the evils inherent in a prison-
type environment?”63 The mock Frankenstein marriage thus seems to presage the fact 
that Zimbardo’s mock prison drama could only ever end with the classical solution of 
bringing in the bride.  
In this way we should resist the temptation to play down the Maslach episode, dis-
missing it as an aspect of Zimbardo’s personal drama unhappily interfering with the 
experiment. On the basis of that assumption one could still claim that Zimbardo’s ex-
periment does touch on a real socio-psychological ground beyond the methodological 
flaws introduced by his personal history.64 But are these two aspects really separable? 
We should consider the following anecdote. On Zimbardo’s website there is a video of 
him giving a Powerpoint presentation. When he comes to the Christina Maslach epi-
sode, he remarks, “The next day I stopped the experiment.” The next slide is of their 
marriage photo and he comments, “… and the next year I was married to her.”65 At this 
point the whole audience explodes in laughter and applause, as if relieved by the happy 
                                                     
 
 
62 P. Zimbardo, "Quiet rage: The Stanford prison study video," my transcription. 
63 A. Zarembo, "A Theater of Inquiry and Evil." 
64 For Martha Nussbaum, for example, Zimbardo is far too emotionally involved for the resulting behaviour to 
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end of the horror story: they married and had many children. Does this collective emo-
tional release on the part of the audience not show that the conclusion of the Stanford 
Prison experiment saved more than just Zimbardo’s experiment and his career? It saved 
a whole discourse and a particular approach within the psy-sciences, namely a psychol-
ogy unable to assess its inevitable and structural link with psychologization. 
Conclusions 
The fact that Zimbardo’s Prison Experiment boils down to a move from Milgram’s acting 
out to a passage à l’acte and back again should not, however, obfuscate the important 
structural shift here. Milgram attempted to deal with the horrors of the Nazi era, as it 
was there that the western world was confronted with the deadlock of the project of 
Enlightenment and the impotence, or even complicity, of scientific discourse. Milgram’s 
experiments are the mise-en-scène of the departure from the master discourse and the 
attempt to reground science within the university discourse, in which the subject be-
comes a psychologized subject, called upon to adopt a scientific gaze. Milgram shows us 
that this turn to the university discourse in late modernity structurally glides over the 
discourse of psychology and, thus, over the problematic status of subjectivity. This is, of 
course, the return of the inherent paradoxes of the modern Cartesian subject insofar as 
Descartes’s endeavour was already an attempt to posit ‘man’ against the objectivizations 
of science. Descartes differentiated res cogito from res extensa as an attempt to constitute 
the subject, not as the sum of the objectivizations of science, but precisely as the re-
mainder, the residue of the encroaching of science on man’s Lebenswelt. As a result, sub-
jectivity is the name of the problematic aspect of modernity. It is at this point that psy-
chology arrives as the discipline which will take care of this problematic subject. Psy-
chology aspires to be the meta-theory of science, resolving the breaches subjectivity 
causes in the constructions of science.  
It was Edmund Husserl who already pointed out the problematic position of psychol-
ogy when he claimed that psychology chooses the wrong option in trying to appropriate 
the same objectifying paradigms that engendered the problem of subjectivity.66 It can be 
claimed that Milgram is caught in the same paradox. In his experiment, the paradoxes 
of modern subjectivity do not only return, his experiment, moreover, shows how these 
paradoxes result in post-Second World War psychology being caught in a fundamental 
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 and structural psychologization.67 Milgram’s paradigmatic experiment lays bare how 
psychology cannot but ground itself in an auto-enactment and the looping of a pre-
scripted situation. George Miller’s call to spread psychology in this way reflects main-
stream psychology’s choice to re-establish itself as a science via psychologization. In the 
experiments of both Milgram and Zimbardo, psychology is indeed given away, it is the 
very motor of the experiments.  
This analysis shows that the underlying paradigm of a whole array of theoretical and 
practical approaches in contemporary psychology relies on feeding psychology into the 
field of research or the field of action. One telling example here is psychologization 
processes of children and youth: via all sorts of media and institutions psychology is 
given away to parents, teachers, educators, and last but not least to the children them-
selves. The psychologist-psychoanalyst Mary Lamia, for example, pleads for a “general 
psychological education” to extend “psychological knowledge and awareness” with pre-
teen children.68 Here it is perfectly clear that psychologization follows the ‘now that you 
know …’ paradigm. For Lamia children have to be instructed 
… to recognize and appreciate individual differences, be responsive to shared ex-
periences among peers, become conscious of the complexity of human motiva-
tion, develop an awareness of appropriate responses to interpersonal situations, 
and identify the availability of choice in attitudes and behaviors.69 
In short, the children are turned into little psychologists, little apprentices of psychol-
ogy. This is the pre-condition for the second part of the paradigm: ‘now that you know, 
how do you feel?’ As Lamia puts it, children should be able to “understand their behavior 
and emotions through the general perspective of a psychologist.”70  
While Milgram can be seen as setting up the scene, Zimbardo starts from the already 
scripted scene. There Zimbardo is pushed to find a way to ground and fix the looping of 
the script of psychology in a mythical heroic journey into the underground of the Real 
of ‘man’. Zimbardo’s enacted passage à l’acte was needed to affirm Milgram’s paradigm. It 
is only with Zimbardo that the paradigm of psychologization grounded by Milgram gets 
its completion: as Zimbardo enacts the power of psychology to reveal ‘man’ as he really 
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is. Zimbardo’s ‘real of man’ is paradigmatic to, for example, the authenticity trope in 
psychologization processes.71 We also see it in reality TV and psychotainment shows that 
supposedly lay bare the real, authentic psychological human condition.72 But the more 
sophisticated place of real ‘man’ today is of course the ‘neurochemical self.’73 Coming in 
brain-charts and gnome-patterns this new homunculus can be said to have taken the 
lead role in today’s psychologization processes, of course only seemingly bypassing the 
paradoxical fact that the (post)modern subject is the enigmatic leftover of the process of 
objectivation. 
The fact that the rebirth of psychology after the war had to come in two steps – Mil-
gram and then Zimbardo – might appear as a repetition of the original double birth of 
psychology as postulated by the Belgian historian Jacques Claes. For Claes, psychology 
first emerged in the Renaissance where this new discipline had to reconnect ‘man’ with 
a receding world.74 In an increasingly secularized world, psychology came to replace 
religion as the mediator between ‘man’ and his world. Psychology’s second birth comes 
with Gustav Theodor Fechner’s psychophysics.75 Fechner regrounded psychology within 
the hard sciences and conceived of ‘man’ as a psychophysical being in order to try to 
reconcile ‘man’ with the modern, rapidly technologized world. The second birth is a 
repetition, but one that consolidates the first birth within the emerging dominant 
framework in society. Postwar psychology, in the same way, is characterized by a double 
birth. Milgram, in the passage from master discourse to the university discourse, re-
grounded psychology as a science that psychologizes its subject. Zimbardo reinforces 
this process of psychologization within the late-modern dominance of the university 
discourse.  
If we contest the emancipatory character of Milgram’s experiments, then we should 
expect to find nothing different in Zimbardo’s experiment. If Milgram psychologized 
the past of the Nazi era, we can, perhaps, understand Zimbardo as having pre-empted 
forms of torture to come, creating, as it where, a rationale for so-called psychological 
torture. Phil Banyard already questioned the legitimacy of Zimbardo’s taking part in the 
Abu Ghraib scandal debate, suggesting a direct route from Zimbardo’s own experiment 
to Abu Ghraib. Banyard argued that, behind the scenes of the black sites, there were psy-
chologists feeding the guards ideas on how to deal with the prisoners.76 This should lead 
us to doubt whether mainstream psychology can ever, as Dan Aalbers puts it, be part of 
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 the clean-up crew striving to stop the abuses in contexts where it has informed abuses 
as in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.77 
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